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Abstract
We study the determinants of the ¯rm-level choice to produce following an order placed by a
downstream ¯rm (production to order) or to produce in advance. We rationalize this choice through
a simple theoretical model and apply it to a ¯rm-level empirical analysis. Relying on a large panel of
Italian manufacturing ¯rms, we show that two main variables a®ect this choice: the distance between
the supplier and the buyer and the degree of product di®erentiation in downstream industries where
products are sold. The impact of proximity on the choice of producing to order crucially depends
on the degree of product di®erentiation in downstream markets. We ¯nd that, in industries where
average product di®erentiation is high, production to order prevails if the supplier is located close
to the buyer. On the contrary, proximity is associated to production in advance in homogeneous
sectors. We also ¯nd that, if suppliers are located in a di®erent country from that of the buyers, they
will tend to produce to order if product di®erentiation in downstream industries is low, and produce
in advance if product di®erentiation is high. We also narrow the scope of our analysis to analyze the
determinants of production to order originating from the same province where the supplier is located.
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11 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to study the determinants of the choice concerning production to order. This
way of organizing production is the opposite of production for stock (also called production in advance)
where products are stored as inventory and shipped as orders arrive.
We consider the transaction that follows a speci¯c order placed by the buyer as a special form
of trading network, giving rise to what we call a pairwise connection. While in organized exchange
markets the price clears demand and supply and it is taken as given by traders, in these networks
the two transacting parties have the possibility to bilaterally negotiate over the price at which the
transaction will actually occur. Moreover, while organized exchange markets are anonymous, when this
kind of pairwise connection emerges, the buyers know exactly who the seller is, and viceversa. As we
will see, orders primarily concern the production of intermediate inputs.
We focus on trade in intermediate inputs that is carried out through pairwise connections for two
main reasons. First, trade in intermediates is becoming increasingly more important as international
disintegration of production does so. A look at input-output tables is illuminating in this respect.
Antrµ as and Helpman (2004), citing various sources of information, report that the share of imported
intermediates in the U.S. increased from 5.3% in 1972 to 11.6 % in 1990. Similar evidence can be
found for Canada and the United Kingdom. Moreover, it has been shown that international trade has
grown faster in components than in ¯nal goods. The second reason deals with the relevance of pairwise
connections among ¯rms in the trade of commodities. Keeping in mind that pairwise connections are
an alternative to organized exchange markets as a mean to trade goods, one can realize that most of
manufacturing goods are traded through networks, and not through organized exchange markets. The
reason is that product di®erentiation is an obstacle to the emergence of markets that are thick enough
to satisfy the standard properties of a competitive exchange equilibrium. In di®erentiated industries,
suppliers are connected with speci¯c contracts to buyers. For this reason, a strong correlation exists
between the degree of product di®erentiation of manufactured products and the way these products
are traded, either through a direct connection between the buyer and the seller, or through anonymous
markets.1
Rauch (1999), using data on U.S. General Imports and Exports for the years 1970, 1980, and 1990,
computes what share of total trade (imports plus exports) belongs to di®erentiated commodities. He
¯nds that, in 1990, roughly 65% of U.S. total trade was done in di®erentiated commodities. This share
was lower in 1970 and 1980, but always above 50%.2 The importance of networks in trade is then the
natural by-product of the importance of di®erentiated commodities.
Summing up, studying the determinants of networks originated by speci¯c orders is a key issue
1This is something we will see in some detail from our ¯rm-level data set.
2Actually, in the liberal classi¯cation employed by Rauch (1999), the share of di®erentiated commodities in U.S. total
trade in 1980 was 48.9%. Rauch explains the temporary fall in 1980 by the huge increase, in that year, in the price of
petroleum, an organized exchange product.
2because of the composite e®ect of several facts: the importance of di®erentiated products in overall
trade volumes; the importance of trading networks in di®erentiated products; the increasing importance
of trade in intermediates.
Because trading di®erentiated products involves a good deal of search costs, it comes as no surprise
what Rauch (1999) ¯nds in the world patterns of international trade. The ¯rst result is that proximity3
is more important for di®erentiated products than for homogeneous products in fostering trade in a
gravity model. The second result is that di®erentiated products tend to be less traded than more
homogenous products. We cast Rauch's analysis into the micro level, as we want to assess what is
role played by proximity in establishing connections among individual ¯rms according to the degree of
product di®erentiation of the products involved in the transactions. For this purpose, we will concentrate
our attention on two polar cases: suppliers that sell their products to nearby buyers, located in the same
industrial district, and suppliers that export their products to foreign buyers.
Our empirical results, based on a large sample of Italian manufacturing ¯rms, concern the likelihood
that agreements concerning production to order emerge. The existence of an exchange of intermediate
inputs between the supplier and the buyer, following a speci¯c order placed by the buyer, signals a
pairwise connection among them. Our estimates show that the probability that this connection exists
is increased if the supplier is located close to the buyers, when downstream industries are characterized
by high product di®erentiation.4 For the same type of downstream markets, the probability that the
connection exists is decreased if the ¯rm produces for foreign buyers. When downstream industries are
homogeneous, it is less likely that the supplier is connected to a buyer in a pairwise fashion if a ¯rm is
located in a district. The opposite holds true for exporting suppliers, since the likelihood of production to
order is increased if the supplier is engaged in exporting. The picture we get is that pairwise connections
concerning production to order among suppliers and buyers are fostered among spatially clustered ¯rms
when downstream industries are di®erentiated. Suppliers connected in a pairwise fashion to foreign
buyers are more likely to operate in homogeneous downstream industries.
As already mentioned, the ¯rst element to consider to explain our results is that, because of the
costliness of the search process involved when product di®erentiation in downstream industries is high,
pairwise connections for the exchange of goods are more easily formed by ¯rms that are spatially
clustered together. For the same reason, international pairwise connections are less likely to arise when
downstream industries are highly di®erentiated.
Another thing to consider are the factors that reduce the hold-up risk. Since producing intermediate
inputs require investments that are relationship-speci¯c when downstream industries are characterized
3Proximity is de¯ned both in a geographical sense and in a cultural sense, the latter being proxied by language or
colonial ties.
4As we will describe at length below, we measure the degree of product di®erentiation of the industry to whom the
intermediate inputs belong to by the average degree of product di®erentiation of the downstream industries where the
inputs are actually used. Information about the use of intermediate inputs produced by a particular industry are retrieved
by Input-Output Use tables.
3by high product di®erentiation, the results' interpretation points to the fact that this type of investment
is more e±cient (and the hold-up problem is mitigated) when the supplier and the recipient of the good
are spatially clustered together. Symmetrically, the hold-up problem is exacerbated when the supplier
and the recipient of the good are located in di®erent countries.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we brie°y review some relevant literature and place our
paper in context. In section 3 we describe the data and variables we use and provide some preliminary
statistics. In section 4 we present a simple model that explains the choice of producing to order or
producing in advance. Section 5 presents our estimation strategy and our empirical results. Section 6
concludes.
2 Relation with previous literature
We have already described the ¯ndings by Rauch (1999). An important technical contribution he gives
is the measurement of industries' product di®erentiation at a very ¯ne level of disaggregation. Nunn
(2007) employs Rauch classi¯cation to measure product di®erentiation in upstream industries. He then
uses this measure to predict patterns of world trade in the following manner. He tests whether judicial
quality (ensuring the enforcement of contracts) can be considered a factor of production on its own. If
this is the case, a Heckscher-Ohlin framework predicts that those industries that employ relationship-
speci¯c-intensive intermediate inputs, being characterized by strong product di®erentiation in upstream
industries, should be predominantly located in countries abundant in judicial quality. He ¯nds that the
data support this prediction. Contrary to Rauch (1999) and Nunn (2007), our approach, more than
being focused on the determinants of aggregate volumes of trade or domestic production, concentrates on
the determinants of pairwise connections among individual ¯rms for the supply of products to domestic
or foreign buyers.
Another strand of the literature linked to our analysis are theoretical papers studying the link
between contractual incompleteness, agglomeration, and industrial clusters' formation.
As reviewed by Duranton and Puga (2004), spatial proximity might mitigate hold-up problems
between buyers and sellers. If a large number of potential buyers is located around, it is likely that
the hold-up problem is less severe for suppliers. This may be precisely the case in big cities as opposed
to smaller urban areas, or in spatial clusters of small and medium-sized ¯rms, as in the case of Italian
industrial districts. Matouschek and Robert-Nicoud (2005) formally develop this line of reasoning in a
slightly di®erent context. They concentrate on relationship-speci¯c investments made by workers. By
substituting the term \intermediate inputs' suppliers" to the term \workers" their reasoning can be
easily generalized. Interpreted in this manner, their paper proves that co-location of ¯rms can induce
more e±cient (industry-speci¯c) investments.
Another theoretical paper in this vein is Helsley and Strange (2007). They analyze a linear space
4where buyers are equally spaced. If there are transaction costs, they show that proximity between buyers
and sellers lowers transaction costs and favors disintegration of production (outsourcing). Moreover,
they also show that, as input demanders become closer to each other, their pro¯ts go up as well. This
happens because agglomeration in space mitigates hold-up risk, thus fostering a more e±cient investment
by inputs' suppliers. This is named by them a \Williamsonian" agglomeration force.
It is well understood since Hotelling (1929) at least that \distance [...] is only a ¯gurative term for a
great congeries of qualities".5 In other terms, it is just a matter of how one interprets the linear space,
since it may stand for the physical space as well as the characteristics' space. So, Helsley and Strange
(2007) results also show that product homogeneity in downstream markets (i.e., similarity in the needs
of inputs' buyers) favors disintegration of production and the establishment of trade in intermediate
inputs between suppliers and buyers. Under this approach, product di®erentiation in physical space and
product di®erentiation in the characteristics' space are just two alternative (and mutually excluding)
ways of interpreting results. Our paper adds to this literature disentangling the role of physical space
and characteristics space in the way of organizing inputs' production. We will show that it is crucial to
consider the interaction among these dimensions, since product di®erentiation in downstream markets
a®ects the sign (either positive or negative) of the e®ect of distance on production decisions.
3 Data and Variables Description
The micro data sets we use for this paper come from the VIII and IX waves of \Indagine sulle imprese
manifatturiere" (Survey on manufacturing ¯rms), carried out by Unicredit-Capitalia, one of the largest
Italian banks. The original data sets contain information for 4,680 Italian ¯rms during 1998-2000
(VIII wave), and for 4,178 ¯rms during 2001-2003 (IX wave). The design of the panel is strati¯ed
and rotating, so that about half of ¯rms in the VIII wave are retained in the IX wave. The surveys
contain detailed information about ¯rms' labor force composition, investment and innovation activity,
internationalization strategies, production choices, ¯nancing choices, etc. In addition, the data sets
include balance sheet information for each of the years covered in the waves. In our analysis, apart from
the productivity estimation procedure, we restrict to the the sample from the IX wave. After standard
trimming procedures, the size of the sample is reduced to 3,419 ¯rms.6
We analyze what are the variables that drive the change in the likelihood that manufacturing sup-
pliers undertake production to order (commessa in Italian) instead of production in advance (also called
for stock). Hitomi (1996) sharply di®erentiates these two ways of production on the ground of certainty
of product speci¯cations. In production to order, speci¯cations of the product are established only on
the receipt of the customer's order, which results in di±culty in production planning and execution. The
good produced is unique, or just small batches are made. In production for stock, product speci¯cations
5Quotation is from Hotelling original paper.
6In Casaburi et al. (2008) the trimming and productivity estimation procedures are described.
5are established in advance of order receipt, with a reasonable certainty about the fact that they will
meet the requirements of customers, thanks to market research that has been previously conducted. In
other terms, market research allows to determine exactly what are the product speci¯cations required
by the market, and this substantially reduces uncertainty. Hence, after market research, production
planning and execution are smoother. This kind of organization is typical of mass production.
To identify whether a ¯rm produces to order or for the stock we employ questions E2. and E3. in
the Unicredit-Capitalia Survey (see Appendix 7.1). The questionnaire gives us some information on
where the ¯nal recipients of the good are located: in the same province, in other cities in the rest of
Italy, or abroad. Unfortunately, we miss explicit information whether the good is actually sold or not
to a buyer located in the same industrial district. But an extremely well-documented literature shows
that ¯rms located in Italian districts have a very low degree of vertical integration, and most of them
act as subcontractors (i.e., they produce to order) for buyers located in the same district. See, just
to cite a few papers, an early contribution by Brusco (1982) and a more recent one by Lazerson and
Lorenzoni (1999). Therefore, location in a district proxies that fact that the ¯rm sells most of its output
to downstream ¯rms located nearby.
Table 1 shows the percentage of ¯rms that produce to order, against three other ¯rm's characteristics:
being an intermediate inputs producers, being located in a district and being an exporter.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
The ¯rst variable (being an intermediate inputs producer) is a dummy variable which takes a value
equal to one if the supplier is selling its product to other ¯rms, except retailers and intermediaries
specialized in goods for households. This information is retrieved through the question E1. in the
Unicredit-Capitalia survey.7 A very large amount of ¯rms that produce to order are indeed producing
intermediate inputs (1,959 ¯rms out of 2,292 that produce to order, roughly 85%). This means that only
15% of ¯rms that produce to order are producing ¯nal goods for retailers, intermediaries, or directly
for households. We note, however, that nothing prevents the sale of ¯nal goods, under production to
order, to retailers or households to be exempted by search costs or hold-up problems. Hence, in what
follows, we will not di®erentiate whether the ¯nal recipient of the product is a ¯rm or is a household,
and we will just concentrate on the fact that it is produced to order or for stock.
The second variable (location in an industrial district) is a dummy which takes value one if two
conditions are met: i) the ¯rm is physically located in an industrial district; ii) its production belongs
to the core sectoral specialization of the district. In this way we want to avoid to classify as being
located in a district ¯rms that are physically there, but whose activity belongs to other industries. As
7See Appendix 7.1. The ¯rm is revealing to produce an intermediate input if the distribution channel is one of the
following: intermediaries specialized in goods for ¯rms (E1.5.); direct sales to ¯rms (through electronic commerce or not,
E1.9. and E1.10.).
6discussed above, Italian industrial districts are the ideal environment to study how the establishment
of pairwise connections to trade goods is a®ected by proximity.
Through the same reasoning, and here we come to the other variable we employ to argue the distance
between the supplier and the buyer, if a ¯rm is an exporter, at least some of its customers will be located
abroad. Being an exporter is then the right proxy for the fact that the supplier sells its product to buyers
located far away, both in terms of physical distance and in terms of institutional barriers existing between
di®erent countries (e.g., di®erent product standards).
Table 1 shows that intermediate inputs' suppliers and ¯rms that are located in a district produce
to order more than the universe of ¯rms in the data set. Exporters produce to order roughly in the
same share of the universe of ¯rms in the sample. However, we will prove that there exists considerable
cross-industry variation in the e®ect of proximity and national borders, depending on the degree of
product di®erentiation of the downstream industries involved. Hence, aggregate data hide considerable
cross-industry variation in the choice of producing to order. Then, we need as a preliminary step to
rank industries in terms of the degree of product di®erentiation of the downstream markets.
Before turning to the classi¯cation of industries according to product di®erentiation, in Table 2, we
focus on those ¯rms that are selling most of the product to foreign buyers. This category is computed
summing the sales' shares provided in Question E3.3 and E3.6: if the sum is equal or greater than 50%,
then the ¯rm is producing to order mainly for foreign customers. Being an exporter turns out to be
almost a necessary condition of this, since 678 out of 696 suppliers of foreign customers declare to be also
exporters.8 Turning to ¯rms located in a district, a low share (26.3%) is exporting the output mainly
to foreign buyers. This share is considerably lower than the 73.5% of ¯rms, from Table 1, located in a
district that are globally producing to order, no matter where the buyer is located.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
3.1 Measuring product di®erentiation in downstream markets
We suggest that the role of spatial proximity in the choice of producing to order or for stock depends
on the speci¯c industry characteristics. In particular, we want to single out is the interaction between
spatial proximity and average product di®erentiation in downstream industries.
We construct a variable, called zj, that measures at the industry level the degree of average product
di®erentiation in the transactions that suppliers undertake with buyers. In order to construct such a
measure, we ¯rst use the industry classi¯cation developed by Rauch (1999). Based on the nature of the
transactions of the goods in the industry, each of the 1,189 sectors of the 4-digit SITC Rev.2 classi¯cation
8There are very few ¯rms (18 out of 696) that do not declare to export, while they are producing to order mainly for
foreign buyers. All these ¯rms are actually selling at least 50% of the product to foreign buyers that do not belong to the
same parent group of the supplier. Hence, in what follows, we consider them to be exporters even if they do not declare
so in their answer to the questionnaire.
7is assigned to one of the following three categories: sold on a standardized exchange market; sold with a
reference price; neither of the two. Rauch develops two classi¯cations using, respectively, a conservative,
and a more liberal criterion for the assignments. Following this distinction, we derive two measures of
contractual intensity, a conservative measure, and a liberal measure.
Next, we combine this information with data coming from the UK 2002 Input-Output Use table.9
The table is based on a speci¯c classi¯cation that is aggregated at an intermediate level between 2-digit
and 3-digit NACE. From now on we will refer to this classi¯cation as IOIC (Input Output Industrial
Classi¯cation).10 This classi¯cation is made of 77 di®erent industries for manufacturing. We then
develop a SITC-IOIC concordance to aggregate the 1,189 SITC industries into the 77 more aggregated
industries of IOIC. For each of these 77 industries we build a variable, Rk, that captures the fraction of
goods produced in a certain industry k that is neither sold on a standardized exchange nor reference-
priced; that is, Rk is the share of products belonging to that industry that are characterized by product
di®erentiation. The higher it is Rk, the higher it is contractual intensity in a particular industry.
We combine the information about industries' contractual intensity with the Input-Output Use table.
By reading the IO table by row, we know how the consumption of intermediate inputs from each industry
is divided across the whole spectrum of using industries. The procedure is similar to the one followed by
Nunn (2007). Di®erently from Nunn (2007), we employ the Use table by row, since we are interested in
the average contractual intensity of the downstream relationships. Nunn (2007) employs the Use table
by column, because he is interested in the average contractual intensity of the upstream relationships.
To give an example of the procedure we implemented, let us consider the following intermediate
product, glass (belonging to the Glass and glass products industry). The top three industries in terms
of the consumption of glass as intermediate input are (in descending order of importance): Motor
vehicles; Glass and glass products itself; Alcoholic beverages. Let us concentrate on motor vehicles
and alcoholic beverages. These industries contains several more detailed industries in terms of the 4-
digit SITC classi¯cation. However, there is considerable homogeneity in terms of the characteristics
of the industries involved. In the case of motor vehicles, all ¯nal products, parts and accessories are
classi¯ed as di®erentiated products. Our procedure posits that, if a glass input is sold to an industry
characterized by product di®erentiation, it has to be di®erentiated itself.11 In the case of alcoholic
beverages, the 4-digit SITC industries as classi¯ed as belonging to markets characterized by a reference
price. In this case we assume that the glass input, similarly to the product for which it is designed, is
not relationship-speci¯c.12
9We use UK Input-Output tables since Italian tables are not available at a ¯ne industrial classi¯cation level.
10Further details about UK Input-Output tables and the classi¯cation system are available on the website of the UK
O±ce for National Statisticis.
11For instance, glass parts of autos are exclusively designed for a particular model (e.g., a Fiat Panda), and cannot be
employed for another model (e.g., a Peugeot 206).
12The suppliers of glass bottles, even in the case they produced a fancy bottle for some beer brand, may sell those bottles
to other buyers in the case the original customer, the one for whom the product was designed, attempts to renegotiate a
8Turning from the absolute amount of consumption of a certain product in a certain industry to
the share of consumption, we derive the fraction of intermediate inputs produced by industry j that
is consumed by industry k, µjk. For each supplying industry, we can therefore compute a weighted
measure of product di®erentiation that takes into account the characteristics of the markets where the
goods produced in that industry are sold, zj =
P
k µjk ¢ Rk. For robustness purposes, we will calculate
this share based on Rauch conservative classi¯cation, zj;cons, and the liberal classi¯cation, zj;lib.
In Table 3 we show by row the three industries with the least contractual intensive downstream
markets, and the three industries with the most contractual intensive downstream markets. The table
provides by column three distinct categories of ¯rms: all ¯rms; ¯rms that produce following a speci¯c
order placed by the buyer; ¯rms that produce to order mainly for buyers located abroad. The cells in
the table are ¯lled with the number of ¯rms satisfying the required characteristics.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Table 3 shows that pairwise connections are more likely if downstream markets are contractual
intensive. Only a small share of ¯rms in the least contractual intensive industries produces following a
speci¯c order placed by the buyer. In these industries, the usual way of supplying products is for stock,
and these products are likely to be sold through organized exchange markets or through a reference
price. On the contrary, the share of ¯rms producing to order is large in the most contractual intensive
sector. In this case, the strong degree of product di®erentiation in parts, components, and ¯nal products
makes pairwise connections to prevail with respect to organized exchange markets' transactions. The
buyers need inputs speci¯cally tailored for them, so that speci¯c pairwise connections are required.
Finally, looking at suppliers whose products are predominantly shipped abroad, we get a similar
picture, because these suppliers are concentrated in the most contractual intensive industries.
4 Proximity and product di®erentiation as determinants of pair-
wise connections: Theory
We present a simple model about the choice by a supplier of engaging in production to order or pro-
duction in advance. The framework generates some predictions that we test in our data. The supplier
produces for another ¯rm a good whose price is normalized to 1. We also assume that the marginal cost
of production is constant at zero. We take as exogenous two key features. First, the distance between
the supplier and the buyer is given. Second, we take as given the degree of product di®erentiation in
downstream markets where the intermediate input produced by the supplier is sold. In what follows we
show how organization of production is a®ected by the balance between these two features.
lower price.
9The ¯rst option for the the supplier is to produce only if it receives a speci¯c order (production to
order). Clearly, in this case it does not face the risk of not ¯nding a buyer, because it will produce only
after a speci¯c order is received. We assume that the supplier knows with certainty that, in the interval
of time under study, a buyer will show up, and he will be willing to pay a price equal to one for the
intermediate input produced by the upstream ¯rm.
On the contrary, a ¯rm that produces in advance faces the risk of not selling its product. Speci¯cally,
under production for stock, we assume that a supplier will sell the product with probability p. The
probability p is a decreasing function of average product di®erentiation in downstream markets, z 2 [0;1].
The higher the degree of product di®erentiation in downstream industries, the more di±cult it will be
to carry out a careful market research needed to meet the requirements of customers. In addition, we
assume that the probability of producing in advance is an increasing function of the proximity between
the seller and the buyer. Again, it is more di±cult to perform market research on potential buyers
located far away. If the measure of distance between the supplier and potential buyers is d, d 2 [0;d],
we have p = p(z;d), with pz(¢) < 0, pd(¢) < 0. We also assume pdz(¢) = 0; that is, the increase in the
risk of not ¯nding a buyer due to an increase in d does not depend on z. The explanation we give to
this assumption is that the way the di±culty of market research increases in distance is the same (or
changes in an amount that can be neglected), irrespective of the degree of product di®erentiation in
downstream industries.
Turning to costs, when the ¯rm accepts an order from another ¯rm it faces an (expected) transaction
cost c. We model c as the sum of two terms, a constant term, c0, and a variable term, h. The term h
depends on two elements. The ¯rst are ex-ante costs of arranging the details of the contract and meeting
the requirements of the buyer (search and matching costs). The second are ex-post costs due to the risk
of opportunistic behavior that can be adopted by the buyer (hold-up risk). In both cases we model h
as an increasing function of the average level of product di®erentiation in downstream markets, z, and
of the distance between the seller and the buyer, d. Thus, h = h(z;d), with hz(¢) > 0 and hd(¢) > 0.
In addition, we assume that hdz(¢) > 0; that is, the increase in the transaction costs due to an increase
in the distance between the buyer and the supplier is higher the higher it is product di®erentiation.
This seems to be a natural assumption and it is consistent with the empirical ¯ndings of Rauch (1999):
distance plays a role in hampering trade particularly when products are not homogeneous. Let us
assume that, if products are perfectly homogeneous, there are no variable transaction costs; that is,
h(0;d) = 0 for every d, and c = c0.
4.1 A special case: Product homogeneity in downstream markets
We analyze the choice between production to order and production in advance by looking ¯rst at the
simple case where the degree of product di®erentiation is zero. The choice of the ¯rm depends only
on d; that is, on the distance between the ¯rm and its potential buyers. The ¯rm chooses to wait for
10an explicit order if the pro¯ts deriving from it, ¼o = 1 ¡ c0, are higher than the expected pro¯ts of
producing in advance ¼a = p(0;d); that is, if:
¼ ´ ¼o ¡ ¼a = 1 ¡ c0 ¡ p(0;d) > 0 ) c0 < 1 ¡ p(0;d) (1)
The continuous variable ¼ is, for the purpose of the estimation strategy, the latent variable. We only
observe whether it is positive (in this case the supplier will choose production to order) or negative (in
this case the supplier will choose production in advance). To make the model interesting, we assume
that 1 ¡ c0 ¡ p(0;0) < 0, and 1 ¡ c0 ¡ p(0;d) > 0: when products are homogeneous, suppliers located
close to buyers choose production in advance, while suppliers located far from buyers wait for an order.
This is depicted in Figure 1.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Since the probability of ¯nding a customer for intermediates produced in advance is inversely related
to distance with the customer, pd < 0, we also get that @¼
@d = ¡pd(¢) > 0. We further assume linearity
of the latent variable in d, that amounts to assuming that pdd = 0. Thus, there exists a threshold
level d¤
0 such that a ¯rm decides to produce for the market if d < d¤
0, and decides to wait for a speci¯c
order from a downstream ¯rm if d > d¤
0. Therefore, we expect that when product di®erentiation is
zero, ¯rms that are more distant from their potential buyers opt for waiting to receive a speci¯c order
from a buyer, while ¯rms close to their buyers opt for production in advance. The intuition is that, in
the homogeneous case, when buyers are distant from suppliers, the ¯xed cost of establishing a pairwise
connection between the two parties for a speci¯c order, c0, is smaller than the risk of not ¯nding a buyer
due to a failure in market research. On the contrary, ¯rms that are located close to their buyers face a
risk of not selling the products that is not sizable enough to prevent them from producing in advance.
This is shown in Figure 1.
4.2 The general case
We now move on to the case in which downstream markets present some degree of di®erentiation.
Similarly to the case with z = 0, ¯rms decide to produce only after a speci¯c order is received if
¼o ¡ ¼a > 0. Now ¼o includes the variable transaction costs term h(z;d); that is, ¼o = 1 ¡ c0 ¡ h(z;d).
Firms choose production to order only if:
¼ ´ ¼o ¡ ¼a = 1 ¡ c0 ¡ h(z;d) ¡ p(z;d) > 0 (2)
For all levels of z,
@¼
@d
= ¡hd(z;d) ¡ pd(z;d): (3)
An increase in distance has two opposite e®ects on ¼: i) it causes a reduction in ¼a due to a decrease
in the probability of ¯nding a buyer for what was produced in advance (second term); ii) it causes a
11reduction in ¼o due to an increase in the transaction costs (search costs and hold-up risk) of contracting
(¯rst term). The latter aspect is more relevant the higher it is the level of z, since hdz(¢) > 0. In
this case, @
2¼
@d@z = ¡hdz(z;d) < 0.13 If we consider a case in which ¡hd(0;d) ¡ pd(0;d) > 0 and
¡hd(1;d)¡pd(1;d) < 0 for all d, there is a certain threshold level ~ z such that the expression in equation
(3) equals zero.
If z > ~ z, an increase in distance reduces the di®erence in pro¯ts of production to order in comparison
to production for the market, making production to order less convenient. If z < ~ z, the expression in
equation (3) is positive. In this case, an increase in distance causes production to order to become more
convenient than production in advance.14 In the rest of the analysis, we consider the simple case in
which hdd(¢) = pdd(¢) = 0; that is, both the probability of not ¯nding a buyer due to a market research
failure and transaction costs are linear in distance.
Let us suppose that we are in an industry where z > ~ z, so that the di®erential ¼a¡¼m is increasing in
d. To make the model interesting, we assume that 1¡c0¡h(z;0)¡p(z;0) > 0 and 1¡c0¡h(z;d)¡p(z;d) <
0. In Figure 2 we depict this case.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
Thus, there exists a threshold level, d¤
z, such that a ¯rm decides to produce for the market if the
buyer is located faraway, d > d¤
z, and decides to wait for a speci¯c contractual arrangement with a
downstream ¯rm only if the buyer is su±ciently close to it, d < d¤
z. Figure 2 shows this result. The
intuition is that, when product di®erentiation is high enough, a reduction in distance (i.e., an increase
in proximity) mitigates transaction costs in a way that is larger than the corresponding reduction in
market research costs, thus making the ¯rm more willing to make a pairwise contractual arrangement.
The converse holds true in sectors with low di®erentiation in downstream markets, z < ~ z. In this case,
if d < d¤
z it will produce in advance. Finally, there also exists a particular level of product di®erentiation
z = ~ z, such that distance does not matter any more in the organization of the modes of production.
Industries characterized by this level of product di®erentiation are neutral, since the option to produce
to order gives always the same pro¯ts of producing in advance.
To summarize, this simple model rationalizes the following organizational choices. First, when
industry's product di®erentiation is low, ¯rms that are close to their potential buyers are more likely
to produce for the market. Second, when sectoral product di®erentiation is high, ¯rms close to their
buyers are more likely to reach a contractual arrangement (i.e., produce to order) before production
takes place. The opposite patterns are observed when suppliers and buyers are distant. We test these
predictions in the next section.
13Remember that we assume pdz(¢) = 0.
14The case in which z=0 is a special case.
125 Proximity and product di®erentiation as determinants of pair-
wise connections: Estimation
5.1 Estimation strategy
This section presents our strategy to measure the relation among proximity, downstream product dif-
ferentiation, and the choice of making a pairwise connection. Our econometric methodology consists in
the estimation of marginal e®ects from a probit model. By estimating marginal e®ects, we determine
the magnitude of the change in the probability that a ¯rm opts to produce to order as a function of the
set of covariates. Equation (4) illustrates our model:
Prob(ordijp = 1) = ©
¡
¯0 + ¯1disti + ¯2expi + ¯3disti ¤ zj + ¯4expi ¤ zj + X0
i¯5 + ´j + ´p
¢
(4)
where i is the ¯rm index, j is the industry index, and p is the spatial index related to the adminis-
trative province where the ¯rm is located.15 X is a set of ¯rm level controls, that includes TFP, size,
capital intensity, skill intensity, and dummies for whether or not the ¯rm belongs to a business group,
and performed or not product innovation in the period 2001-2003.16 The ¯'s are the coe±cients on
covariates.17 In the econometric model, we also include spatial ¯xed e®ects (´p, one for each of the 103
administrative provinces in Italy) and industry ¯xed e®ects (´j, one for each of the 77 industries from
our IOIC classi¯cation).
As described in the previous section, dist and exp are the variables that capture proximity. In a
sense, they are two polar cases. As we argued at length above, there exists an overwhelming evidence
that suppliers located in a district sell most of their output to ¯rms located nearby. On the contrary,
the export status, by de¯nition, signals that a certain ¯rm sells to foreign partners.18
Our two measures of sectoral downstream product di®erentiation, zj;cons and zj;lib, are alternatively
used in the two interactions terms, disti ¤zj and expi ¤zj. The coe±cients on these two terms measure
whether the role of the distance between the supplier and the buyer (captured by exp and dist) changes
according to the level of product di®erentiation in the downstream industries where the products are
sold.
In light of section 4, we expect the interaction term expi ¤ zj to have a negative sign: product
di®erentiation has a negative e®ect on the choice to produce intermediates after speci¯c orders from
15Italy is divided in 103 administrative provinces, that correspond to NUTS3 partitioning.
16See Appendix 7.2 for variables' de¯nition.
17The vector ¯5 groups coe±cients on control variables.
18From an econometric point of view, the presence of ¯rms that are simultaneously located in a district and are exporters
is noisy. In the present version of the paper, we do not tackle this issue in any manner. In ongoing work on this issue, we
classify exporters that are located in a district as follows. If they export more than a certain threshold of total revenues,
we keep them as exporters and drop them as ¯rms located in a district, because the greatest part of their transactions is
with foreign ¯rms. If they export less than a certain threshold they are kept as ¯rms that are located in a district and
dropped as exporters.
13buyers that are located abroad. In addition, our simple model suggests that the the sign of the coe±cient
¯2 on the exp variable should be positive. Recall that this coe±cient measures the impact of a change of
the export status (i.e., our proxy for farness between supplier and buyer) on the probability of making
downstream connections when the degree of di®erentiation takes the value of zero.19 Our hypothesis
is that, for highly homogeneous sectors, the risk of hold-up and search costs are low compared to the
risk of market research activity for distant customers, and then suppliers wait for an order from foreign
¯rms.
We expect the interaction term disti ¤ zj to be positive. Spatial proximity (that is, agglomeration
in an industrial district specialized in a particular sector) raises the probability of producing to order in
contract-intensive sectors for the reasons outlined in section 4.20 The sign of ¯1, the coe±cient on dist,
measures the role of proximity in highly homogeneous industries, where hold-up risk and search costs
are zero. Our model suggests that, in homogeneous downstream industries, ¯rms located in a district
may be more willing to undertake production in advance since they can rely on reliable market research
on a wide range of potential buyers. Thus, in the supply of homogeneous industries, ¯rms in a district
are more willing to produce in advance. This explanation suggests that we expect the coe±cient of dist
to have a negative sign.
5.2 Empirical Results
Table 4 presents our base results. In the ¯rst column, we estimate the change in the probability of
producing to order induced by the district and export status variables, in addition to the interac-
tions between the district and export status on the one side, and average product di®erentiation in
downstream industries on the other side. The introduction of the interaction terms with downstream
product di®erentiation provides a major insight on the determinants of production to order. In column
[1], we include the measure of downstream di®erentiation using Rauch's conservative classi¯cation. Both
disti ¤ zj;con and expi ¤ zj;con have the expected sign and they are statistically signi¯cant at 1% level.
For high levels of product di®erentiation, proximity between buyers and sellers (captured by dist) pos-
itively a®ects the likelihood of making pairwise connections to provide products to downstream ¯rms,
19When zj;cons or zj;lib are zero, no downstream industry is characterized by product di®erentiation. Every downstream
market for ¯nal products and parts and components is an organized exchange market or is characterized by reference prices.
20Apart from the balance between market research costs and transaction costs, we can think of other reasons that
explain the increase in the likelihood to produce to order in ¯rms are spatially clustered. A wide literature stresses the
relevance of communication and information °ows among ¯rms located within districts. The literature describing this
process is really vast. See, among many other papers, Maskell and Malmberg (1999), Capello and Faggian (2005), Lazerson
and Lorenzoni (1999), Giuliani (2007). Firms in a district can take advantage of information and experiences gained by
others. In our case, the relevant information concerns other ¯rms' contractual experience with speci¯c buyers. We label
this e®ect as the \spillover" e®ect of being located in a district (as opposed to the \proximity" e®ect). The \spillover"
e®ect is more relevant in highly di®erentiated sectors, because it allows the ¯rm to reduce search costs and the risk of
hold-up. Therefore, it provides another reason for expecting a positive sign in the interaction coe±cient disti ¤ zj.
14while farness (captured by exp) negatively a®ects it. For low levels of product di®erentiation, the role
of proximity is reversed; that is, location in a district reduces the probability of making production to
order, while export activity increases it. In column [2] we present the same results using Rauch's liberal
classi¯cation. Our results are robust to this new variable: relevant coe±cients are still signi¯cant and
the magnitude of marginal e®ects is comparable across the two speci¯cations.
In column [3] we also include a set of ¯rm-level controls. In addition to proximity variables and their
interactions, the variables that signi¯cantly a®ect the probability of production to order are: ¯rm's size
(negative e®ect), ¯rm's total factor productivity (negative e®ect), capital intensity per worker (negative
e®ect), a dummy for product innovation in the period 2001-2003 (positive e®ect). Since capital per
worker and total factor productivity are positively correlated, dropping capital per worker from the
probit regression raises the statistical signi¯cance of TFP (column [4]). Results tell us that suppliers
connected in a pairwise fashion to buyers are smaller and less capital intensive. They are also less
productive, but they tend to be more innovative than the rest of ¯rms in the panel. In section 5.3
below, we will show that the latter result depends from a speci¯c set of ¯rms, those that belong to
international networks.
In column [5] we interact all the ¯rm-level control variables with the conservative measure of product
di®erentiation, without ¯nding any signi¯cant e®ect.21 The proximity variables and their interactions
are still signi¯cant.
Finally, in the last column, we estimate the change in the probability of producing through a pairwise
connection after having dropped all the interaction terms with product di®erentiation. We show that, if
we ignore the role played by product di®erentiation and contractual intensity, export status and location
in a district do not explain the change in the probability of producing to order. This means that, as
shown by our theoretical section, the role of distance in promoting pairwise connections between buyers
and sellers changes according to the level of product di®erentiation in downstream markets.
Our results provide support, at a micro-economic level, to Rauch's ¯ndings at the aggregate level.
Proximity boosts networks between suppliers and customers (giving rise to production to order behavior)
if product di®erentiation among downstream ¯rms is high. We motivate the result with the existence
of hold-up risk and search costs that are mitigated by proximity and exacerbated by farness. Moreover,
our ¯ndings show that the same logic equally applies to international trade and domestic trade issues,
to the extent that trade within industrial districts is found to enhance production to order behavior in
di®erentiated industries, while farness characterizing international trade markets is found to weaken it.
5.3 Extensions and sensitivity of results
Our data also allow us to test models similar to (4) on a subsample of pairwise connections. In the ¯rst
¯ve columns, we focus on the change in the likelihood that ¯rms engage in: a) pairwise transactions
21The same result is obtained with the interactions with the liberal measure, but it is not reported to save on space.
15with ¯rms located in the same province; b) pairwise transactions with foreign ¯rms. When we consider
the choice of production to order for the same province, the international status of the ¯rm should
not matter anymore. In Table 4 we used exp as a proxy for the fact that a relevant portion of the
operations of the suppliers involved foreign partners, and therefore was characterized by a low level of
proximity. Clearly, this reasoning no longer applies when we restrict to within-province connections.
Table 5 shows that the coe±cients of exp and expi ¤ zj;cons are no longer signi¯cant and this supports
our hypothesis about the role of export status as a proxy for farness of buyers. The coe±cients on dist
and disti ¤zj;cons are still signi¯cant, even if slightly less than in the main regression. This is due to the
fact that, restricting to a narrower spatial area, we encounter less variability in terms of the e®ect of
distance on the choice to produce or not to order.22 So, we expect the advantage of being in a district
to be measured less precisely. Turning to the interpretation of results, since the interaction disti ¤ zj is
still signi¯cant, the estimation indicates that the bene¯ts of proximity between suppliers and buyers are
rather localized. We can indirectly infer that the geographical scope of the Williamsonian agglomeration
economies we identi¯ed is an area smaller than the province, which coincides with the district.23
In column [4] and [5] we focus on the case where production to order comes mainly (at least 50% of
total production to order) from foreign buyers. When looking at this sub-sample, obviously all the ¯rms
choosing to produce to order are exporters, so we only include dist, as a proxy for proximity. When
the supplier receives an order from abroad, a pairwise connection with foreign buyers is established. As
expected, being in a district does not a®ect the propensity to produce to order for foreign customers.
Apart from the proximity measures, it is interesting to compare the characteristics of the ¯rms
making production to order according to the localization of the customer (column [3] and column [5]).
If suppliers are connected in a pairwise fashion to buyers located in the same province, they turn out
to be smaller, and less capital intensive; they are also less productive and less skill-intensive.24 Overall,
they are performing rather poorly. Turning to ¯rms producing to order mainly for foreign customers,
they are bigger and more innovative than the rest of ¯rms. These di®erences show that ¯rms belonging
to local networks are very di®erent from ¯rms primarily engaged in international networks.
In column [6] we focus exclusively on orders coming from a di®erent group. The interest in this
kind of estimation lies in the fact that transaction costs that hinder pairwise connections (search costs
or hold-up risk) could be alleviated if the supplier and the buyer belong to the same parent group.
Conversely, in the case of suppliers receiving orders from outside the parent group, these costs could
be larger. A crude comparison of the coe±cients on the proximity variables dist and exp and on their
interactions in column [6] from Table 5 and in column [3] from Table 4 show that they are not di®erent.
22In terms of the simple model of section 4, this corresponds to a decrease in the maximum distance d that is observed
in the data.
23Notice, however, that, as noted above, in the geographical area delimited by a district other factors could be at work,
namely embeddedness in local communities and knowledge spillovers. These features do not mechanically depend on
physical distance.
24The statistical signi¯cance for the latter two negative coe±cients is only 5%.
16This suggests that the transaction costs do not signi¯cantly decrease when the buyer and the supplier
belong to the same group.
The sensitivity check concerns ¯rms' dimension. In column [7] we perform the probit regression
only for the subsample of ¯rms with less than 250 employees. Results do not change, apart from the
coe±cient on the product innovation variable. This fact supports the view that those ¯rms where
product innovation plays a role in fostering pairwise connections are the bigger ¯rms, that are also
those more involved in international trade networks (keep in mind results from column [5]).
5.4 Production to order and transportability
The establishment of networks due to speci¯c orders could be a®ected by other factors that we are
omitting from the probit regression. This would bias our estimation. In particular, an important issue
is the one of transportability of commodities. By transportability, we refer to insurance and freight costs.
The higher they are, the lower it is transportability. If di®erentiated commodities are less transportable
than other commodities, buyers will generally be located close to suppliers. Hence, the empirical results
we described in the previous sections (the prevalence of pairwise connections when buyers and suppliers
are spatially close together) could be driven by low transportability.
Rauch (1999) computes measures of transportability for di®erentiated, organized exchange, and
reference priced commodities, based on U.S. imports from Japan or comparably distant countries. He
¯nds that di®erentiated commodities are roughly twice as transportable as the other two groups. Even if
his results should be applied with caution to our framework provided that they concern only international
transactions, they show that the bias in the estimation, if any, would be against our results.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we discussed the determinants of an important choice concerning the way production is
organized: whether to produce after a speci¯c order is placed by a buyer, or whether to produce in
advance for the market. We discussed to what extent production to order is di®erent from production
for stock, and how this di®erence is related to the functioning of markets: while the pairwise connection
originating from production to order is associated to a network, products made in advance are generally
sold through organized exchange markets, or through transactions carried out with reference prices.
This fact implies that the choice of producing to order or in advance depends on the relative e±ciency
between networks and markets as a mean to carry out transactions.
We singled out two important features that a®ect the choice to use networks or markets to sell
products to customers: the ¯rst is proximity between buyers and sellers, and the second is the degree
of product di®erentiation in downstream industries.
We proved that the same logic and the same factors that inhibit trade in international markets are
17at work in the much smaller entities constituted by Italian industrial districts. To this purpose, we
showed that location in a district reduces the risks for suppliers of being held up by the principal (the
buyer), and also reduces search and matching frictions between buyers and suppliers. Therefore, the
advantage of being located in a district is larger for ¯rms operating in industries characterized by a high
relationship-speci¯city in downstream markets. Following a similar reasoning, suppliers selling to buyers
located in foreign countries, that operate in industries where product di®erentiation is high, should opt
for using exchange markets as a mean to trade goods, and then should produce in advance.
Turning to industries where product di®erentiation and the associated transaction costs are low, we
argued that the di±culties associated to market research, compared to the lower incidence of transaction
costs, induce suppliers with distant buyers to opt for production to order. Instead, suppliers located
close to their buyers choose production in advance.
7 Appendix
7.1 Questions in the Unicredit-Capitalia Survey about sales' organization
E1. Having normalized to 100 the total revenues in the year 2003, state the percentage share for each
type of distribution channel:
² E1.1. Modern national distribution channels (including: hypermarkets, department stores, cash
& carry, hard discount, specialized retail stores);
² E1.2. Modern foreign distribution channels (including: hypermarkets, department stores, cash &
carry, hard discount, specialized retail stores);
² E1.3. Franchising sales;
² E1.4. Intermediaries specialized in goods for households;
² E1.5. Intermediaries specialized in goods for ¯rms;
² E1.6. Small retailers;
² E1.7. Direct sales to households (not through electronic commerce);
² E1.8. Direct sales to households through electronic commerce;
² E1.9. Direct sales to ¯rms (not through electronic commerce);
² E1.10. Direct sales to ¯rms through electronic commerce;
² E1.11. Other customers.
E2. Having normalized to 100 the total revenues in the year 2003, state the percentage share for each
type of selling:
² E2.1. Selling of goods produced under an order placed by the buyer;
² E2.2. Selling of goods produced by the ¯rm on its own.
[If the answer to question E2.1. is greater than zero, answer the following question]:
E3. Having normalized to 100 total revenues in the year 2003 from production to order, state the
percentage share for each type of buyer:
18² E3.1. Firms belonging to the same parent group that are localized in the same province;
² E3.2. Firms belonging to the same parent group that are localized in the rest of Italy;
² E3.3. Firms belonging to the same parent group that are localized abroad;
² E3.4. Other ¯rms that are localized in the same province;
² E3.4. Other ¯rms that are localized in the rest of Italy;
² E3.6. Other ¯rms that that are localized abroad;
² E3.7. Government and public agencies;
² E3.8. Other buyers.
7.2 Description of ¯rm level controls
Size (occu): The size measure we use is the total number of employees, including entrepreneurs and
management.
Total factor productivity (TFP): Total factor productivity is estimated following Levinsohn and
Petrin (2003) procedure, as in Casaburi et al. (2008).
Capital per worker (capwork): Total assets divided by size (as de¯ned above).
Skill per worker (skillwork): The share of white collars over the total number of employees (size
variable). White collars are entrepreneurs, managers, and clerks.
Product innovation (prodinno): Firms were asked to report whether, over the 2001-2003 period, they
introduced at least one new product or signi¯cantly improved an existing one.
Belonging to a group (group): Dummy variable indicating whether the ¯rm belongs to a business
group.
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20Table 1: Number of ¯rms producing to order, and status of ¯rms
All ¯rms Intermediates Located Exporters
producers in a district
Production to order
Yes 2,292 1,959 444 1,700
(67.0%) (72.6%) (73.5%) (66.6%)
No 1,127 739 160 854
(33.0%) (27.4%) (26.5%) (33.4%)
Total number 3,419 2,698 604 2,554
Note: The table reports the number of ¯rms, both in absolute terms and percentage terms (in paren-
thesis), that produce or not to order in the case of three classes of ¯rms: all ¯rms in the IX wave; ¯rms
producing intermediate inputs; ¯rms located in a district; exporters.
Table 2: Number of ¯rms producing to order mainly for foreign buyers (in value terms), and status of
¯rms




Yes 696 159 678
(20.4%) (26.3%) (26.5%)
No 2,723 445 1,876
(79.6%) (73.7%) (76.5%)
Total number 3,419 604 2,554
Note: The table reports the number of ¯rms, both in absolute terms and percentage terms (in paren-
thesis), that produce or not an intermediate input following a speci¯c order placed mainly by foreign
buyers (in value terms) in the case of three classes of ¯rms: all ¯rms in the IX wave; ¯rms located in a
district; exporters.
21Table 3: Production to order by contractual intensity in downstream markets
All Production to order Production to order
(%) mainly from abroad (%)
Industries
Least contractual intensive
Production, processing, preserving of meat (.192) 64 13 (20.3%) 0
Alcoholic beverages, alcohol and malt (.260) 53 15 (28.3%) 3 (5.7%)
Vegetable and animal oils and fats (.287) 15 4 (26.7%) 0
Most contractual intensive
Electronic valves and tubes, other components (.999)33 26 (78.8%) 8 (24.2%)
Insulated wire and cable (.997) 15 9 (60.0%) 2 (13.3%)
TV and radio receivers, recorders (.994) 2 1 (50.0%) 1 (50.0%)
Note: The table provides by row the three industries with the least contractual intensive downstream
markets, and the three industries with the most contractual intensive downstream markets (conserva-
tive classi¯cation, zj's are reported after each industry). The table provides by column three distinct
categories of ¯rms: all ¯rms; ¯rms that produce to order; ¯rms that produce to order mainly for buy-
ers located abroad. The cells in the table are ¯lled with the number of ¯rms satisfying the required
characteristics. The percentages shown in brackets are in terms of the total number of ¯rms in the
corresponding industry.
22Table 4: The determinants of production to order: Baseline estimation
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
dist -.444** -.412** -.403** -.404** -.413** .016
(.127) (.119) (.135) (.134) (.133) (.025)
exp .322** .287** .363** .358** .307** -.007
(.090) (.085) (.093) (.092) (.100) (.024)
dist ¤ zj;cons .513** .467** .463** .480**
(.153) (.154) (.154) (.153)
exp ¤ zj;cons -.482** -.402** -.461** -.394**
(.108) (.117) (.110) (.117)
dist ¤ zj;lib .487**
(.143)
exp ¤ zj;lib -.456**
(.104)
ln(occu) -.050** -.055** -.004 -.053**
(.013) (.013) (.052) (.013)
ln(TFP) -.055* -.073** .067 -.049*
(.025) (.024) (.084) (.024)
ln(capwork) -.053** -.035 -.052**
(.010) (.036) (.010)
ln(skillwork) -.010 -.011 .011 -.011
(.009) (.009) (.035) (.009)
prodinno .053** .052** .044 .053**
(.019) (.019) (.079) (.019)
group -.020 -.031 -.156 -.022
(.022) (.010) (.101) (.022)
ln(occu) ¤ zj;cons -.056
(.065)
ln(TFP) ¤ zj;cons -.158
(.108)
ln(capwork) ¤ zj;cons -.022
(.046)
ln(skillwork) ¤ zj;cons -.027
(.044)
prodinno ¤ zj;cons .011
(.098)
group ¤ zj;cons .167
(.117)
Spatial ¯xed e®ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry ¯xed e®ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared .16 .16 .19 .18 .19 .18
N. obs. 3,343 3,343 3,308 3,308 3,308 3,308
Note: The table reports marginal e®ects from probit regressions, which include dummies for each
province and each industry. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. **, and * denote signi¯cance at
the 1, and 5 per cent level respectively.
23Table 5: The determinants of production to order: Supplementary regressions and sensitivity of results
Order from the Order mainly Order from a Less than
same province from abroad di®erent group 250 employees
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
dist -.284** -.255** .023 -.061 .011 -.382** -.438**
(.087) (.093) (.025) (.119) (.021) (.134) (.137)
exp -.024 -.005 -.137** .281** .367**
(.091) (.091) (.025) (.094) (.096)
dist ¤ zj;cons .449* .397* .098 .476** .502**
(.178) (.177) (.157) (.162) (.155)
exp ¤ zj;cons -.192 -.158 -.312** -.468**
(.111) (.112) (.114) (.112)
ln(occu) -.062** -.063** .030** .030** -.044** -.021
(.013) (.013) (.011) (.011) (.013) (.016)
ln(TFP) -.062* -.060* .002 .002 -.068** -.054*
(.024) (.024) (.021) (.021) (.025) (.026)
ln(capwork) -.031** -.031** -.016 -.016 -.044** -.046**
(.010) (.010) (.009) (.009) (.011) (.011)
ln(skillwork) -.019* -.020* -.001 -.001 -.010 -.006
(.009) (.009) (.008) (.008) (.009) (.009)
prodinno .031 .031 .106** .106** .049* .028
(.018) (.018) (.016) (.016) (.019) (.019)
group -.040 -.041 .0 .0 -.127** -.023
(.021) (.021) (.019) (.019) (.023) (.023)
Spatial ¯xed e®ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry ¯xed e®ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared .12 .15 .14 .12 .12 .18 .18
N. obs. 3,229 3,196 3,196 2,979 2,979 3,308 2,978
Note: The table reports marginal e®ects from probit regressions, which include dummies for each province and
each industry. In columns from [1] to [6] we consider speci¯c categories of buyers. In columns from [1] to [3] we
consider the choice of producing to order for a buyer that is located in the same province. In column [4] and [5]
we consider the choice to produce to order mainly for a buyer that is located abroad. In column [6] we consider
a buyer that does not belong to the same business group. Finally, in column [7] we keep in the sample only
¯rms with less than 250 employees. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. **, and * denote signi¯cance at

















Figure 2: The plot of the latent variable ¼ when z > ~ z
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